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lundi 3 mars 2008

Repères 03/03/08 - D'importants généraux démissionneront si George W. Bush donne l'ordre d'attaquer l'Iran

Repères 03/03/08 - D'importants généraux démissionneront si George W. Bush donne l'ordre d'attaquer l'Iran

US generals ‘will quit’ if Bush orders Iran attack
The Sunday Times February 25, 2007

"SOME of America’s most senior military commanders are prepared to resign if the White House orders a military strike against Iran, according to highly placed defence and intelligence sources.

Tension in the Gulf region has raised fears that an attack on Iran is becoming increasingly likely before President George Bush leaves office. The Sunday Times has learnt that up to five generals and admirals are willing to resign rather than approve what they consider would be a reckless attack.

“There are four or five generals and admirals we know of who would resign if Bush ordered an attack on Iran,” a source with close ties to British intelligence said. “There is simply no stomach for it in the Pentagon, and a lot of people question whether such an attack would be effective or even possible.”

A British defence source confirmed that there were deep misgivings inside the Pentagon about a military strike. “All the generals are perfectly clear that they don’t have the military capacity to take Iran on in any meaningful fashion. Nobody wants to do it and it would be a matter of conscience for them..."

 

dimanche 2 mars 2008

Repères 02/03/08 - Info ou intox, la bombe iranienne ?

Repères 02/03/08 - Info ou intox, la bombe iranienne ?

Le journal Le Monde met en avant de nouvelles données d'information sur la dimension militaire du programme nucléaire iranien, données qui remettraient en cause les estimations des services secrets américains selon lesquelles la composante militaire du programme nucléaire iranien aurait été abandonnée en 2003.

L'AIEA détient des preuves que l'Iran a mené un programme nucléaire militaire après 2003
LE MONDE 01.03.08

"Les experts de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA), bras de l'ONU chargé de vérifier le respect des normes de non-prolifération, détiennent des documents indiquant que l'Iran a mené des travaux sur l'élaboration d'une ogive nucléaire et que ces efforts se sont poursuivis au-delà de l'année 2003, contrairement à ce qu'ont affirmé les agences de renseignement américaines en décembre 2007.

Ces éléments ont été exposés pour la première fois dans le détail, le 25 février, par le directeur général adjoint de l'AIEA, le Finlandais Olli Heinonen, lors d'une présentation à huis clos devant des représentants des missions étrangères auprès du siège de l'Agence, à Vienne...

...La présentation de M. Heinonen a suscité une vive colère du représentant iranien, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, présent lors de la réunion. Ce dernier a parlé d'une falsification des documents et d'une tentative américaine de saborder la coopération entre l'Iran et l'AIEA. L'exposé portait sur trois projets iraniens : la conversion de dioxyde d'uranium (Green Salt Project), des études sur des explosifs de haute intensité et la mise au point d'un corps de rentrée de missile. Des documents ont été montrés sur des travaux portant sur des systèmes de mise à feu à haute tension et des détonateurs multiples pouvant se déclencher simultanément..."


Lire aussi :

L'AIEA détaille la "possible dimension militaire" des travaux nucléaires de l'Iran
LE MONDE 23.02.08

 

Information ou désinformation ? Les données mises en avant par le journal Le Monde sont récurrentes, pour être déjà apparues en 2004, et prêtent pour le moins à interrogation.

Iran Nuke Laptop Data Came from Terror Group
By Gareth Porter, WASHINGTON, Feb 29 (IPS)

"The George W. Bush administration has long pushed the "laptop documents" -- 1,000 pages of technical documents supposedly from a stolen Iranian laptop -- as hard evidence of Iranian intentions to build a nuclear weapon. Now charges based on those documents pose the only remaining obstacles to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declaring that Iran has resolved all unanswered questions about its nuclear programme.

But those documents have long been regarded with great suspicion by U.S. and foreign analysts. German officials have identified the source of the laptop documents in November 2004 as the Mujahideen e Khalq (MEK), which along with its political arm, the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), is listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organisation.

There are some indications, moreover, that the MEK obtained the documents not from an Iranian source but from Israel's Mossad.

In its latest report on Iran, circulated Feb. 22, the IAEA, under strong pressure from the Bush administration, included descriptions of plans for a facility to produce "green salt", technical specifications for high explosives testing and the schematic layout of a missile reentry vehicle that appears capable of holding a nuclear weapon. Iran has been asked to provide full explanations for these alleged activities.

Tehran has denounced the documents on which the charges are based as fabrications provided by the MEK, and has demanded copies of the documents to analyse, but the United States had refused to do so.

The Iranian assertion is supported by statements by German officials. A few days after then Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the laptop documents, Karsten Voight, the coordinator for German-American relations in the German Foreign Ministry, was reported by the Wall Street Journal Nov. 22, 2004 as saying that the information had been provided by "an Iranian dissident group".

A German official familiar with the issue confirmed to this writer that the NCRI had been the source of the laptop documents. "I can assure you that the documents came from the Iranian resistance organisation," the source said.

The Germans have been deeply involved in intelligence collection and analysis regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. According to a story by Washington Post reporter Dafna Linzer soon after the laptop documents were first mentioned publicly by Powell in late 2004, U.S. officials said they had been stolen from an Iranian whom German intelligence had been trying to recruit, and had been given to intelligence officials of an unnamed country in Turkey.

The German account of the origins of the laptop documents contradicts the insistence by unnamed U.S. intelligence officials who insisted to journalists William J. Broad and David Sanger in November 2005 that the laptop documents did not come from any Iranian resistance groups.

Despite the fact that it was listed as a terrorist organisation, the MEK was a favourite of neoconservatives in the Pentagon, who were proposing in 2003-2004 to use it as part of a policy to destabilise Iran. The United States is known to have used intelligence from the MEK on Iranian military questions for years. It was considered a credible source of intelligence on the Iranian nuclear programme after 2002, mainly because of its identification of the facility in Natanz as a nuclear site.

The German source said he did not know whether the documents were authentic or not. However, CIA analysts, and European and IAEA officials who were given access to the laptop documents in 2005 were very sceptical about their authenticity.

The Guardian's Julian Borger last February quoted an IAEA official as saying there is "doubt over the provenance of the computer".

A senior European diplomat who had examined the documents was quoted by the New York Times in November 2005 as saying, "I can fabricate that data. It looks beautiful, but is open to doubt."

Scott Ritter, the former U.S. military intelligence officer who was chief United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, noted in an interview that the CIA has the capability test the authenticity of laptop documents through forensic tests that would reveal when different versions of different documents were created.

The fact that the agency could not rule out the possibility of fabrication, according to Ritter, indicates that it had either chosen not to do such tests or that the tests had revealed fraud...

...In her February 2006 report on the laptop documents, the Post's Linzer said CIA analysts had originally speculated that a "third country, such as Israel, had fabricated the evidence". They eventually "discounted that theory", she wrote, without explaining why...


Lire aussi :

Disinformation flies as US raises Iran bar
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi, Asia Times Feb 21, 2008

 

mardi 15 janvier 2008

La phrase du jour 15/01/08 - George W. Bush

La phrase du jour 15/01/08 - George W. Bush

"Je ne peux contrôler ce que la communauté du renseignement dit mais les conclusions du National Intelligence Estimate ne reflètent pas mes propres vues"

George W. Bush à Ehud Olmert dans une conversation privée citée par un haut fonctionnaire américain présent

Le National Intelligence Estimate, signé des 16 agences américaines de renseignement, a estimé, "avec un degré de certitude élevé" qu'à l'automne 2003, Téhéran a mis fin à son programme d'armes nucléaires.

George W. Bush, sachant qu'il ne peut plus attaquer l'Iran avant son départ, donne t-il ainsi son feu vert à Ehud Olmert ?


Bothersome Intel on Iran
NEWSWEEK Jan 21, 2008

"In public, President Bush has been careful to reassure Israel and other allies that he still sees Iran as a threat, while not disavowing his administration's recent National Intelligence Estimate. That NIE, made public Dec. 3, embarrassed the administration by concluding that Tehran had halted its weapons program in 2003, which seemed to undermine years of bellicose rhetoric from Bush and other senior officials about Iran's nuclear ambitions. But in private conversations with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert last week, the president all but disowned the document, said a senior administration official who accompanied Bush on his six-nation trip to the Mideast. "He told the Israelis that he can't control what the intelligence community says, but that [the NIE's] conclusions don't reflect his own views" about Iran's nuclear-weapons program, said the official, who would discuss intelligence matters only on the condition of anonymity..."

Artificial Intelligence
Slate Jan. 14, 2008

"...This remark has three baleful consequences. First, it can't help but demoralize the intelligence community. NIEs are meant, ultimately, for only one reader, the president; and here's the president telling another world leader that he doesn't believe it because, well, he doesn't agree with it.

Second, it reinforces the widespread view that the president views intelligence strictly as a political tool: When it backs up his policies, it's as good as gold; when it doesn't, it's "just guessing." This result is that all intelligence is degraded and devalued, at home and abroad. Let's say that six months from now Bush publicizes an NIE concluding that Iran has resumed its nuclear-weapons program or that, say, North Korea is reprocessing more plutonium. Given that he pooh-poohed an NIE that rubbed against his own views, why should anyone take him seriously for embracing an NIE that confirms them?

Third, by telling Olmert that it's all right to ignore the NIE, Bush is in effect telling him that Israel should go ahead and behave as if its findings had never been published. Hirsh reports that, when Olmert was asked whether he felt reassured by Bush's words, he replied, "I am very happy." ABC News reported Monday that, at a closed hearing of the Israeli parliament's foreign affairs and defense committee, Olmert testified, "All options that prevent Iran from gaining nuclear capabilities are legitimate within the context of how to grapple with this matter."..."

 

mardi 8 janvier 2008

Repères 08/01/08 - Mauvais temps pour Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ?

Repères 08/01/08 - Mauvais temps pour Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ?

A President’s Defender Keeps His Distance
New York Times January 8, 2008

"A rift is emerging between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, suggesting that the president no longer enjoys the ayatollah’s full backing, as he did in the years after his election in 2005...

...There are numerous possible reasons for Mr. Ahmadinejad’s loss of support, but analysts here all point to one overriding factor: the United States National Intelligence Estimate last month, which said Iran had suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003 in response to international pressure. The intelligence estimate sharply reduced the threat of a military strike against Iran, allowing the Iranian authorities to focus on domestic issues, with important parliamentary elections looming in March...

...Relations between the United States and Iran will always be difficult — as the encounter between Iranian speed boats and three United States Navy warships in the Strait of Hormuz on Monday made clear — but perhaps not impossible, many here are saying.

Liberal commentators, here and abroad, have long argued that hard-line policies in the West only strengthen hard-line politicians in Iran, and conversely that lowering the threat level enhances the position of moderates. With conservative politicians who supported Mr. Ahmadinejad in 2005 increasingly turning into his fiercest critics, and with Ayatollah Khamenei saying recently that Iran’s lack of contacts with the United States “does not mean that we will not have relations indefinitely,” the pundits would seem, for now, to be on the right track.


Lire également :

Analyses 28/10/07 - Iran : Il faut écouter et ré-écouter Dominique de Villepin - Par Jean-Philippe Miginiac 28 octobre 2007

 

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