Following U.N. Resolution 1701, a cease-fire between belligerent forces in
Lebanon began on August 14. During the first hours after the cease-fire took
effect, both the Israeli Defense Forces (I.D.F.) and Hezbollah were abiding by
it, notwithstanding isolated incidents.
Security issues concerning the region's stability and the risks for the U.N.
international force that will be sent to Lebanon within ten days are now the
main concerns for global and regional powers. At the same time, the 2006
Israeli-Lebanese conflict and the subsequent U.N.-sponsored cease-fire are
having important political and strategic implications for the Middle East's
balance of power and, more generally, for the global geopolitical
chessboard.
Speaking to Lebanese television network al-Manar on the evening of August
14, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah delivered a significant speech. He
called Hezbollah's performance in the conflict a "historical and strategic
triumph." Nevertheless, his statement was expected, as part of the "battle of
communiqués" in which both sides claimed a clear victory.
The political importance of Nasrallah's words lie instead in the political
plans that emerge from some key phrases. He made clear that the Shi'a militia's
heavy armament "will constitute the basis for a strong Lebanese state," thus
proposing himself and his organization as an all-national leadership and
explicitly de-legitimizing the Lebanese army, saying that it is "unable to
protect the country in case of war." He then concluded by saying that Hezbollah
will actively take part in humanitarian assistance for the hard-hit population
and called it "immoral" to even talk about the militia's disarmament.
The problem for the United Nations is that Resolution 1701 explicitly calls
for such a disarmament; in paragraph 8, it states that "there will be no
weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State" and, in
paragraph 11e, it decides that the multinational force shall "assist the
Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as
referred to in paragraph 8."
Moreover, because the United States and the European Union agree that
Beirut's government must regain full control of its national sovereignty,
Nasrallah's declarations directly challenge their views and signal Hezbollah's
not-so-hidden political agenda: the progressive rise to Lebanon's dominant
political and military force.
Therefore, the ground has been prepared for a difficult political,
diplomatic and strategic task. Political and military decision-makers must not
underestimate the serious security issues that will concern troops sent to
Lebanese territory and the political consequences of a possible deterioration
of the post-cease-fire context.
The U.N. Resolution and its Security Implications
With Resolution 1701, the United Nations decided to strengthen its current
mission in Lebanon that was established in 1978 by raising its numbers to
15,000 units in order to support Beirut's army, which is called upon to
guarantee the full implementation of the Taif Accords (1989) and of U.N.
resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006). France agreed to take the leadership
of the force, while Italy will provide up to 3,500 personnel. Spain, Portugal,
and Finland will also count among the likely participants, while Australia,
Canada, Malaysia, and Indonesia are among the non-E.U. countries that are
considering sending troops. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told the press
on August 14 that Israel's approximately 30,000 troops would withdraw from
southern Lebanon only when the U.N. units arrived.
As with every U.N. resolution and international accord, it is important to
pay attention to the details and the language of the text. Apart from the above
mentioned paragraphs that will inevitably cause friction with Hezbollah, the
crucial issue is that of the rules of engagement regarding the multinational
force. It is up to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to define the rules of
engagement on the basis of the resolution draft. The draft was relatively loose
on the military side of the matter and it is likely that U.N. forces will do
little more than self-defense.
As a consequence, if Lebanon is to fulfill its duties and ensure the
disarmament of Hezbollah, a serious problem will arise. Nasrallah's words
confirmed what was already clear to any observer of recent Lebanese history:
the Shi'a militia will not disarm because its long-term goals are the final
strategic victory over Israel and the construction of a strong Lebanese state
allied with Iran, rather than one allied with the U.S.-Israeli combine.
Since Iran will continue to back Hezbollah, and Syria will do so unless the
United States engages Damascus in a broad diplomatic effort to start a new,
regional peace process that will not be the same as pursuing Washington's
proposed "New Middle East," the cease-fire appears fragile and may fail in the
coming weeks or months before the U.N. forces are able to effectively reshape
the political and security contexts.
The only real alternative to such instability is a comprehensive regional
political and diplomatic agreement with Tehran and Damascus, which does not
seem likely in light of the current political orientations of the current U.S.
and Iranian governments.
The Significance of the Cease-Fire
As a result of the July-August conflict, Hezbollah is winning the
information war within the Arab world even though it suffered losses in the 32
days of the war. Israel decided to advance cautiously and slowly on the ground
after the air campaign because it was concerned with the high number of
casualties caused by Hezbollah's fierce resistance.
According to Israel, it destroyed much of Hezbollah's longer-range Zelzal
missiles, killed approximately 500 guerrillas, disrupted the militia's supply
routes and eliminated some top officers. Nevertheless, Israel failed to
annihilate the organization's offensive capability (which was the war's
declared objective). [See: "Intelligence Brief: Israel's Strategic
Security"]
Therefore, the perception of the I.D.F.'s performance in Israel and in the
world has been decisively affected by this result. Public opinion -- and
decision-makers themselves -- always recall the stunning rapidity of the 1967
and 1973 Israeli victories against Arab states. As a consequence, Hezbollah's
steadfast defense is being perceived as a political victory by many, and
especially by those in the Middle East.
What is more important is that Israel's air campaign and the destruction it
caused have strengthened Hezbollah's image at home and abroad. Whereas in the
first hours of the conflict many Arab officials blamed the war on Hezbollah,
this context changed after Israel's disastrous bombardment of Qana and after
other Israeli actions that caused significant civilian casualties.
Therefore, Israel -- and the United States as its main supporter and sponsor
-- failed almost completely in their political objectives to de-legitimize
Hezbollah. Instead, Hezbollah can claim a social and political victory.
Conclusion
It can be expected that Hezbollah will try to capitalize from its political
success as it will try to progressively take control of the leadership in
Lebanon. Beirut's current administration appears weak, and the only variable
that could change the balance of power between Lebanon's Siniora government and
Hezbollah would be a massive influx of U.S.-E.U. military aid to Lebanon's
army, which could easily spark a very dangerous conflict between the latter and
Hezbollah.
On the other hand, if France and the other components of the U.N. forces
refrain from decisively upgrading Beirut's military capabilities, the effective
disarmament of Hezbollah seems impossible to attain, thus putting the
resolution and U.N. credibility at risk.
With Hezbollah and its leader rapidly emerging as a dominant force in
Lebanon, expect Israel and the United States to consider all available options
to destroy what they perceive as an unacceptable threat. Because of Tehran's
deep involvement in Lebanon via Hezbollah, the stage is set for a new phase in
the U.S.-Iranian conflict.
Copyright © Federico Bordonaro & Jean-Philippe Miginiac
Tous droits réservés
Cette analyse a également été publiée sur The Power and Interest News
Report (PINR)...
The Strategic Implications of the
Lebanese Cease-Fire
Analysis 15/08/06, by Federico Bordonaro & Jean-Philippe
Miginiac
