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Repères 16/03/08 - Qui est vraiment Khamenei ?

Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader
By Karim Sadjadpour, Carnegie Endowment Report, March 2008

"There is perhaps no leader in the world more important to current world affairs but less known and understood than Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran. In a unique and timely new study Carnegie’s Karim Sadjadpour presents an in-depth political profile of Khamenei based on a careful reading of three decades' worth of his writings and speeches.

Sadjadpour argues that “Iran’s Islamic government is more powerful than it has ever been vis-à-vis the United States, Khamenei is more powerful than he’s ever been within Iran, and in order to devise a more effective U.S. policy toward Iran a better understanding of Khamenei is essential.” Though Khamenei is sometimes dismissed as weak and indecisive, Sadjadpour writes, “his rhetoric depicts a resolute leader with a remarkably consistent and coherent—though highly cynical and conspiratorial—world view.”

Given that the real political power of the Iranian Supreme Leader dwarfs that of the president, Sadjadpour argues, “It’s time for the world to focus less on Ahmadinejad and more on Khamenei. His speeches present arguably the most accurate reflection of Iranian domestic and foreign policy aims and actions over the last two decades.” He explores how Khamenei’s unexpected ascent to power is instructive in understanding his style of leadership, and unearths insightful quotes that provide deep insight into Khamenei’s thoughts on issues such as the United States, Israel, Iraq, President Ahmadinejad, and the nuclear issue.

“Given Iran’s centrality to urgent U.S. and European foreign policy challenges—namely Iraq, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy security, Arab–

Israeli peace, and Afghanistan,” Sadjadpour writes, “the United States does not have the luxury of shunning dialogue with Tehran until Khamenei’s death or the arrival of a more accessible Iranian leader. This could be a long time in coming.”

Sadjadpour argues that any successful approach toward Iran must take into account Khamenei’s pivotal role in Iran’s decision-making process and his deeply held suspicions of the United States. “Trying to engage an Iran with Khamenei at the helm will no doubt be trying, require a great deal of nuance and patience, and offer no guaranteed chance of success. But an approach toward Iran that aims to ignore, bypass, or undermine Khamenei is guaranteed to fail.”

 

Repères 02/03/08 - Info ou intox, la bombe iranienne ?

Le journal Le Monde met en avant de nouvelles données d'information sur la dimension militaire du programme nucléaire iranien, données qui remettraient en cause les estimations des services secrets américains selon lesquelles la composante militaire du programme nucléaire iranien aurait été abandonnée en 2003.

L'AIEA détient des preuves que l'Iran a mené un programme nucléaire militaire après 2003
LE MONDE 01.03.08

"Les experts de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA), bras de l'ONU chargé de vérifier le respect des normes de non-prolifération, détiennent des documents indiquant que l'Iran a mené des travaux sur l'élaboration d'une ogive nucléaire et que ces efforts se sont poursuivis au-delà de l'année 2003, contrairement à ce qu'ont affirmé les agences de renseignement américaines en décembre 2007.

Ces éléments ont été exposés pour la première fois dans le détail, le 25 février, par le directeur général adjoint de l'AIEA, le Finlandais Olli Heinonen, lors d'une présentation à huis clos devant des représentants des missions étrangères auprès du siège de l'Agence, à Vienne...

...La présentation de M. Heinonen a suscité une vive colère du représentant iranien, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, présent lors de la réunion. Ce dernier a parlé d'une falsification des documents et d'une tentative américaine de saborder la coopération entre l'Iran et l'AIEA. L'exposé portait sur trois projets iraniens : la conversion de dioxyde d'uranium (Green Salt Project), des études sur des explosifs de haute intensité et la mise au point d'un corps de rentrée de missile. Des documents ont été montrés sur des travaux portant sur des systèmes de mise à feu à haute tension et des détonateurs multiples pouvant se déclencher simultanément..."

Lire aussi :

L'AIEA détaille la "possible dimension militaire" des travaux nucléaires de l'Iran
LE MONDE 23.02.08

 

Information ou désinformation ? Les données mises en avant par le journal Le Monde sont récurrentes, pour être déjà apparues en 2004, et prêtent pour le moins à interrogation.

Iran Nuke Laptop Data Came from Terror Group
By Gareth Porter, WASHINGTON, Feb 29 (IPS)

"The George W. Bush administration has long pushed the "laptop documents" -- 1,000 pages of technical documents supposedly from a stolen Iranian laptop -- as hard evidence of Iranian intentions to build a nuclear weapon. Now charges based on those documents pose the only remaining obstacles to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declaring that Iran has resolved all unanswered questions about its nuclear programme.

But those documents have long been regarded with great suspicion by U.S. and foreign analysts. German officials have identified the source of the laptop documents in November 2004 as the Mujahideen e Khalq (MEK), which along with its political arm, the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), is listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organisation.

There are some indications, moreover, that the MEK obtained the documents not from an Iranian source but from Israel's Mossad.

In its latest report on Iran, circulated Feb. 22, the IAEA, under strong pressure from the Bush administration, included descriptions of plans for a facility to produce "green salt", technical specifications for high explosives testing and the schematic layout of a missile reentry vehicle that appears capable of holding a nuclear weapon. Iran has been asked to provide full explanations for these alleged activities.

Tehran has denounced the documents on which the charges are based as fabrications provided by the MEK, and has demanded copies of the documents to analyse, but the United States had refused to do so.

The Iranian assertion is supported by statements by German officials. A few days after then Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the laptop documents, Karsten Voight, the coordinator for German-American relations in the German Foreign Ministry, was reported by the Wall Street Journal Nov. 22, 2004 as saying that the information had been provided by "an Iranian dissident group".

A German official familiar with the issue confirmed to this writer that the NCRI had been the source of the laptop documents. "I can assure you that the documents came from the Iranian resistance organisation," the source said.

The Germans have been deeply involved in intelligence collection and analysis regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. According to a story by Washington Post reporter Dafna Linzer soon after the laptop documents were first mentioned publicly by Powell in late 2004, U.S. officials said they had been stolen from an Iranian whom German intelligence had been trying to recruit, and had been given to intelligence officials of an unnamed country in Turkey.

The German account of the origins of the laptop documents contradicts the insistence by unnamed U.S. intelligence officials who insisted to journalists William J. Broad and David Sanger in November 2005 that the laptop documents did not come from any Iranian resistance groups.

Despite the fact that it was listed as a terrorist organisation, the MEK was a favourite of neoconservatives in the Pentagon, who were proposing in 2003-2004 to use it as part of a policy to destabilise Iran. The United States is known to have used intelligence from the MEK on Iranian military questions for years. It was considered a credible source of intelligence on the Iranian nuclear programme after 2002, mainly because of its identification of the facility in Natanz as a nuclear site.

The German source said he did not know whether the documents were authentic or not. However, CIA analysts, and European and IAEA officials who were given access to the laptop documents in 2005 were very sceptical about their authenticity.

The Guardian's Julian Borger last February quoted an IAEA official as saying there is "doubt over the provenance of the computer".

A senior European diplomat who had examined the documents was quoted by the New York Times in November 2005 as saying, "I can fabricate that data. It looks beautiful, but is open to doubt."

Scott Ritter, the former U.S. military intelligence officer who was chief United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, noted in an interview that the CIA has the capability test the authenticity of laptop documents through forensic tests that would reveal when different versions of different documents were created.

The fact that the agency could not rule out the possibility of fabrication, according to Ritter, indicates that it had either chosen not to do such tests or that the tests had revealed fraud...

...In her February 2006 report on the laptop documents, the Post's Linzer said CIA analysts had originally speculated that a "third country, such as Israel, had fabricated the evidence". They eventually "discounted that theory", she wrote, without explaining why...

Lire aussi :

Disinformation flies as US raises Iran bar
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi, Asia Times Feb 21, 2008