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mardi 29 avril 2008

Repères 29/04/08 - Etats-Unis - Le retour des faucons

Repères 29/04/08 - Etats-Unis - Le retour des faucons

La fin du mandat de George W. Bush sera t-elle guerrière ? C'est en tout cas ce que semblent suggérer deux des meilleurs observateurs et analystes des milieux néo-conservateurs de Washington. Tous deux convergent à noter la résurgence des faucons derrière la récente nomination du Général David Petraeus à la tête du Centcom, en lieu et place de l'Amiral Fallon opposé à une attaque contre l'Iran, et la multiplication récente des déclarations contre les agissements de l'Iran et de la Syrie.

Notre propre analyse nous conduit toujours à écarter l'hypothèse d'une attaque de l'Iran. Les Etats-Unis n'en ont plus les moyens et il faudrait, notamment, beaucoup plus d'ordre, d'organisation, de coordination et de détermination partagée sur la scène du théatre washingtonien (le Pentagone et la hiérarchie militaire sont plutôt contre, tout comme le Congrès).

Peut-on pour autant écarter l'impensable ? Il semble bien que non car du désordre de l'Administration Bush finissante la pire des folies peut encore émerger !

 

Hawks Resurgent?
Analysis by Jim Lobe, IPS Apr 25

"Are the latest accusations and tough language leveled against Iran, Syria, and North Korea evidence of a resurgence by the remaining hawks in the administration of President George W. Bush hoping for a final confrontation against one or more members of the revised "axis of evil" before his term ends next January?

That's the big question here this week, particularly following Thursday's long-awaited intelligence briefings to Congress about alleged North Korean involvement in the construction of a "covert nuclear reactor" in Syria that was destroyed in a raid by Israeli warplanes in September last year.

According to some interpretations, the briefing's timing and content appeared deliberately designed to raise tensions between Washington, on the one hand, and Pyongyang and Damascus, on the other, potentially derailing ongoing long-running negotiations between the State Department and North Korea and Turkish-mediated peace feelers between Israel and Syria.

That Vice President Dick Cheney, whose opposition to engaging both North Korea and Syria and support for "regime change" in both countries is both well known and of long standing, had pushed hard for the briefing to take place has added to speculation that a major power play by the hawks to reverse the diplomacy that has dominated Bush's second term is underway.

Rumours that the State Department's point man on North Korea, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill -- whose latest accord with Pyongyang negotiated in Singapore earlier this month has been the target of fierce right-wing attacks led by Cheney chum, former U.N. Amb. John Bolton -- has told associates that he will resign next month have added to concerns that the hawks have regained the initiative, at least on that front.

Add the promotion of Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq who has overseen the past year's "surge" of U.S. troops, to take over the U.S. Central Command (Centcom) this summer, as well as the increasingly harsh charges against Iran's alleged interference in Iraq that have been coming out of the Pentagon in recent days.

All these developments are seen by some as an answer to the prayers of neo-conservatives, in particular, who had largely given up hopes that Bush could be persuaded to attack Iran's nuclear facilities before leaving office..."

 

Petraeus Promotion Frees Cheney to Threaten Iran
Analysis by Gareth Porter, IPS Apr 23

"The nomination of Gen. David Petraeus to be the new head of the Central Command not only ensures that he will be available to defend the George W. Bush administration's policies toward Iran and Iraq at least through the end of Bush's term and possibly even beyond.

It also gives Vice President Dick Cheney greater freedom of action to exploit the option of an air attack against Iran during the administration's final months.

Petraeus will take up the CENTCOM post in late summer or early fall, according to Defence Secretary Robert Gates.

The ability of the administration to threaten Iran with an attack both publicly and behind the scenes had been dramatically reduced in 2007 by opposition from the former CENTCOM commander, Adm. William Fallon, until he stepped down from the post under pressure from Gates and the White House last month.

Petraeus has proved himself willing to cooperate closely with the White House policy lines on Iraq and Iran, arguing against any post-surge reduction in troop strength policy and blaming Iran for challenges to the U.S. military presence. Along with the deference to Petraeus in Congress and the media, his pliability on those issues made him the obvious choice to replace Fallon.

But Petraeus had already effectively taken over many of the powers of the CENTCOM commander last year.

As the top commander in Iraq, Petraeus was in theory beneath Fallon in the chain of command. But in reality Petraeus ignored Fallon's views and took orders directly from the White House. Petraeus was in effect playing the role of CENTCOM commander in regard to the twin issues of Iraq and Iran.

Fallon clashed with Petraeus repeatedly from the beginning of his command about the surge and U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Fallon opposed the surge and believed the U.S. should begin the withdrawal of most of its troops from Iraq. But he was effectively stymied by the close Petraeus-White House link from being able to influence U.S. military policy in Iraq and the region as a whole.

Fallon had also pushed very hard, according to a source familiar with his thinking, for trying to negotiate an agreement with Iran over innocent passage through the Strait of Hormuz in order to ease tensions caused by the U.S.-Iranian differences over the obligations of navy vessels

transiting the Strait. But any such negotiations would have conflicted with the administration's emphasis on confrontation with Iran, and they weren't interested.

Petraeus revealed in his Congressional testimony Apr. 10 that he had already assumed some of the functions normally carried out by the CENTCOM commander in regard to relations with military leaders in the region. Petraeus said he had "actually gone to a couple of neighbouring countries in an effort... to get at the networks, the countries in which they operate, and the sources of some of these foreign fighters."

In fact, the Associated Press reported, Petraeus had taken trips to five different Middle Eastern countries -- Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates -- since September 2007. That should have been Fallon's job, but the White House had apparently made it clear they wanted Petraeus -- not Fallon -- to undertake missions.

It had become increasingly evident to Fallon that he was not really running things at CENTCOM, according to the source. Fallon's frustration about Petraeus' de facto power over Middle East policy was the main reason he was ready to step down.

But it was Fallon's refusal to accept the that the option of a military strike against Iran was still effectively on the table that led to serious tensions with the White House, as reported in Esquire magazine in early March. Fallon had evidently angered Cheney by suggesting publicly on three occasions between September and late November that a military strike against Iran had been ruled out by Washington.

Fallon's resignation announcement on Mar. 11 was followed less than a week later by a 10-day Cheney trip to the Middle East in which the vice president talked explicitly about the military option against Iran during visits to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. That suggested that Cheney felt freer to wield the military threat to Iran with Fallon neutralised.

Cheney aggressively solicited political support from Turkish leaders for a U.S. strike against Iranian nuclear facilities during his visit to Turkey last month, according to a source familiar with Cheney's meeting in Ankara.

Cheney was "very aggressive" in asking Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, as well as Turkey's chief of general staff Gen. Yasar Bukyukanit to get "on board" with such an attack, according to the source, who has access to reports from the Cheney visit.

Cheney indicated that Turkey had been added to the trip at the last minute, suggesting that the decision to visit Ankara was linked to the Fallon resignation.

After the meeting between Cheney and King Abdullah on the same trip, Saudi sources let it be known to the media that Abdullah had told Cheney that his government opposed any U.S. military strike against Iran. That suggested that Cheney had brought up the military option in Ryadh as well.

One of Cheney's main objectives on the trip appears to have been to get the message to Iran that the option of a strike against its nuclear facilities is still very much alive.

In an interview with Cheney while he was in Ankara, ABC News reporter Martha Raddatz commented, "[W]hen you come over here, people in the region start thinking you're over here to plan some sort of military action."

Cheney strongly implied that it was indeed the major objective of his trip. "Well, I think the important thing to keep in mind," he said, "is the objective that we share with many of our friends in the region, and that is that a nuclear-armed Iran would be very destabilising for the entire area."

Petraeus has become the primary administration spokesman for the argument holding Iran primarily responsible for the Shiite military resistance

to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Petraeus and his staff developed the idea in early 2007 that Iran was using so-called "special groups" of renegade Mahdi Army fighters to wage a proxy war against U.S. forces.

In his testimony before Congressional committees earlier this month, Petraeus declared that what he called the "special groups" allegedly organised and manipulated by Iran "pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq"."

 

Lire également :

U.S. Weighing Readiness for Military Action Against Iran
Washington Post Saturday, April 26

"The nation's top military officer said yesterday that the Pentagon is planning for "potential military courses of action" as one of several options against Iran, criticizing what he called the Tehran government's "increasingly lethal and malign influence" in Iraq.

Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a conflict with Iran would be "extremely stressing" but not impossible for U.S. forces, pointing to reserve capabilities in the Navy and Air Force..."

 

Clear Iranian role in Baghdad violence: military
AFP Sun Apr 27

"BAGHDAD (AFP) - Iraqi and US military commanders on Sunday claimed a clear Iranian role in violence engulfing Baghdad's Sadr City, where Shiite militiamen have been battling security forces for the past month..."

 

lundi 14 avril 2008

Repères 14/04/08 - Confirmation de discussions secrètes USA-Iran sur le nucléaire

Repères 14/04/08 - Confirmation de discussions secrètes USA-Iran sur le nucléaire

US and Iran holding 'secret' talks on nuclear programme
The Independant 14/04/08

"Iran and the United States have been engaged in secret "back channel" discussions for the past five years on Iran's nuclear programme and the broader relationship between the two sworn enemies, The Independent can reveal.

One of the participants, former senior US diplomat Thomas Pickering, explained that a group of former American diplomats and experts had been meeting with Iranian academics and policy advisers "in a lot of different places, although not in the US or Iran".

"Some of the Iranians were connected to official institutions inside Iran," he said in a telephone interview from Washington. The group was organised by the UN Association of the USA, a pro-UN organisation. Its work was facilitated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a government-funded think-tank chaired by the former chief UN weapons inspector for Iraq, Rolf Ekeus.

While the nuclear issue was "prominent", Mr Pickering said, "we discussed what's going on domestically in both countries and wide-ranging issues" affecting the US-Iran relationship. Although none of the group members was from the US or Iranian governments, he said that "each side kept their officials informed". The Bush administration "did not discourage us," he added...

...The revelation about the existence of an Iran-US back channel coincides with the recent publication by three of its American members, including Mr Pickering, of proposals aimed at overcoming the deadlock between Iran and the West over Tehran's nuclear ambitions. The initiative addresses the crunch issue of Iran's right to enrich uranium on its own soil while providing guarantees that the nuclear fuel will not be diverted for military purposes...

...The Luers-Pickering-Walsh initiative gives Iran the opportunity to prove that its nuclear intentions are peaceful by yielding to the Iranians' key demand for a uranium enrichment programme on Iranian soil. The enrichment activities would take place under the supervision of a jointly managed international consortium. The plan is the most detailed of its kind since 2005. Conditions to be negotiated with Iran would include:

*a UN Security Council resolution authorising the arrangement and specifying that if Iran breaks the agreement, member states would be authorised to take punitive action;

*Iran would be barred from producing highly enriched uranium, which is weapons grade fuel, or reprocessed plutonium, which can be an alternative route to producing a bomb;

*Iran would implement the stringent inspection measures in the Additional Protocol to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty;

*Iran would commit itself to building only "safe" light-water reactors."

 

Voir :

A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff
By William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering, Jim Walsh
New York Review of Books  March 20, 2008

"The recent National Intelligence Estimate's conclusion that Tehran stopped its efforts to develop nuclear weapons in 2003, together with the significant drop in Iranian activity in Iraq, has created favorable conditions for the US to hold direct talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The Bush administration should act on this opportunity, if for no other reason than that its current position is growing weaker, and without such an initiative, Iran will continue its efforts to produce nuclear fuel that might, in the future, be used to build nuclear weapons..."


UN Plaza: Ambassador Thomas Pickering
UN Dispatch 07/04/08

"In this week's UN Plaza, former US Ambassador to the United Nations Thomas Pickering discusses his New York Review of Books article in which he and co-authors William Luers and Jim Walsh propose a sensible diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear stand-off. In the segment below, Ambassador Pickering explains why bombing Iran is a terrible, terrible alternative."

Thomas R. Pickering sur Wikipedia

 

15/04/08 - La Maison Blanche dément

Nucléaire iranien : la Maison Blanche dément des pourparlers secrets avec Téhéran
LE MONDE 15.04.08

"La présidence américaine a démenti, lundi 14 avril, l'existence de "pourparlers secrets" avec l'Iran sur son programme nucléaire militaire... Ces rencontres "purement privées", a rétorqué la Maison Blanche, n'avaient "aucun statut officiel" et "n'étaient pas un moyen de passer des messages"...

...Selon Robert Malley, chargé du dossier Proche-Orient au groupe de réflexion International Crisis Group (que M. Pickering copréside), ce contact n'était qu'un "parmi les divers canaux"  actifs à Washington sur le dossier iranien. Son existence était "connue des experts" et il ne constituait qu'une "piste deux" ("track two" en langage diplomatique, c'est-à-dire informelle, par opposition aux contacts secrets "piste un" ou "un et demi" officiels ou semi-officiels). Dès lors, pourquoi ce "canal" devient-il une "affaire" longtemps après avoir été rendu public sans démenti ? ...

...Washington bruisse d'échos sur une reprise de l'affrontement, à la Maison Blanche, entre le "clan" du vice-président Dick Cheney, qui serait partisan de mener une attaque contre les sites nucléaires iraniens, et ses opposants, emmenés par le secrétaire à la défense, Robert Gates, et la secrétaire d'Etat, Condoleezza Rice. Un diplomate américain en poste à Bagdad estime cependant que "presque plus personne n'envisage sérieusement d'attaquer l'Iran". Selon lui, l'ambassadeur américain en Irak, Ryan Crocker, et le général David Petraeus, chef des forces de la coalition, y sont également opposés..."

 

dimanche 16 mars 2008

La phrase du jour 16/03/08 - la présidence slovène de l'Union européenne

La phrase du jour 16/03/08 - la présidence slovène de l'Union européenne

Les élections législatives qui viennent de se tenir en Iran "n'ont été ni libres, ni équitables"

la présidence slovène de l'Union européenne dans un communiqué publié à Bruxelles

 

Les élections iraniennes "ni libres ni équitables"
BRUXELLES AFP 16 mars 2008 - Les élections législatives qui viennent de se tenir en Iran "n'ont été ni libres, ni équitables", a déclaré dimanche la présidence slovène de l'Union européenne dans un communiqué publié à Bruxelles. L'UE exprime "sa profonde préoccupation devant le fait que les procédures électorales dans la République islamique d'Iran ont été au-dessous des standards internationaux et que le processus électoral n'a pas permis des élections véritablement concurrentielles", a indiqué la présidence slovène. "Les élections n'ont été ni libres, ni équitables", a-t-elle déclaré.

 

Repères 16/03/08 - Qui est vraiment Khamenei ?

Repères 16/03/08 - Qui est vraiment Khamenei ?

Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader
By Karim Sadjadpour, Carnegie Endowment Report, March 2008

"There is perhaps no leader in the world more important to current world affairs but less known and understood than Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran. In a unique and timely new study Carnegie’s Karim Sadjadpour presents an in-depth political profile of Khamenei based on a careful reading of three decades' worth of his writings and speeches.

Sadjadpour argues that “Iran’s Islamic government is more powerful than it has ever been vis-à-vis the United States, Khamenei is more powerful than he’s ever been within Iran, and in order to devise a more effective U.S. policy toward Iran a better understanding of Khamenei is essential.” Though Khamenei is sometimes dismissed as weak and indecisive, Sadjadpour writes, “his rhetoric depicts a resolute leader with a remarkably consistent and coherent—though highly cynical and conspiratorial—world view.”

Given that the real political power of the Iranian Supreme Leader dwarfs that of the president, Sadjadpour argues, “It’s time for the world to focus less on Ahmadinejad and more on Khamenei. His speeches present arguably the most accurate reflection of Iranian domestic and foreign policy aims and actions over the last two decades.” He explores how Khamenei’s unexpected ascent to power is instructive in understanding his style of leadership, and unearths insightful quotes that provide deep insight into Khamenei’s thoughts on issues such as the United States, Israel, Iraq, President Ahmadinejad, and the nuclear issue.

“Given Iran’s centrality to urgent U.S. and European foreign policy challenges—namely Iraq, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy security, Arab–

Israeli peace, and Afghanistan,” Sadjadpour writes, “the United States does not have the luxury of shunning dialogue with Tehran until Khamenei’s death or the arrival of a more accessible Iranian leader. This could be a long time in coming.”

Sadjadpour argues that any successful approach toward Iran must take into account Khamenei’s pivotal role in Iran’s decision-making process and his deeply held suspicions of the United States. “Trying to engage an Iran with Khamenei at the helm will no doubt be trying, require a great deal of nuance and patience, and offer no guaranteed chance of success. But an approach toward Iran that aims to ignore, bypass, or undermine Khamenei is guaranteed to fail.”

 

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