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mardi 18 mars 2008

Repères 18/03/08 - Carnage et désespoir, l'Irak cinq ans après

Repères 18/03/08 - Carnage et désespoir, l'Irak cinq ans après

Carnage and despair: Iraq five years on
Amnesty International Report 03/08

"Five years after the US-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussain, Iraq is one of the most dangerous countries in the world. Hundreds of people are being killed every month in the pervasive violence, while countless lives are threatened every day by poverty, cuts to power and water supplies, food and medical shortages, and rising violence against women and girls. Sectarian hatred has torn apart families and neighbourhoods that once lived together in harmony.

Despite the heavy US and Iraqi military and police presence, law and order remain a distant prospect. The US-led Multinational Force (MNF) and the Iraqi government formed from political parties that gained from or emerged out of the 2003 invasion have failed to institute the rule of law, uphold human rights, bring peace and security, or end impunity..."

 

dimanche 16 mars 2008

Repères 16/03/08 - Dr Conrad, l'historien qui avait prévu ce qui s'est passé en Irak

Repères 16/03/08 - Dr Conrad, l'historien qui avait prévu ce qui s'est passé en Irak

The Army Monograph that Predicted Just About Everything that's Happened in Iraq
History News Network 10/03/08

"...Dr. Conrad Crane is sometimes referred to as the historian who predicted what would happen in Iraq. In point of fact a lot of historians warned that we were headed into a mess. But Crane, Director of the U. S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA, bravely issued his warning from his perch at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. His monograph, co-authored with Dr. Terrill, was published in February 2003, a month before we went to war. Excerpts appear below...

...Rebuilding Iraq will require a considerable commitment of American resources, but the longer U.S. presence is maintained, the more likely violent resistance will develop...

...To be successful, an occupation such as that contemplated after any hostilities in Iraq requires much detailed interagency planning, many forces, multi-year military commitment, and a national commitment to nation-building.

Recent American experiences with post-conflict operations have generally featured poor planning, problems with relevant military force structure, and difficulties with a handover from military to civilian responsibility.

To conduct their share of the essential tasks that must be accomplished to reconstruct an Iraqi state, military forces will be severely taxed in military police, civil affairs, engineer, and transportation units, in addition to possible severe security difficulties.

The administration of an Iraqi occupation will be complicated by deep religious, ethnic, and tribal differences which dominate Iraqi society.

U.S. forces may have to manage and adjudicate conflicts among Iraqis that they can barely comprehend.

An exit strategy will require the establishment of political stability, which will be difficult to achieve given Iraq’s fragmented population, weak political institutions, and propensity for rule by violence..."

 

Voir :

RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: INSIGHTS, CHALLENGES, AND MISSIONS FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO
Conrad C. Crane, W. Andrew Terrill, February 2003

 

mardi 12 février 2008

Repères 12/02/08 - Les erreurs de la guerre contre la terreur

Repères 12/02/08 - Les erreurs de la guerre contre la terreur

United States Lacks the Capability to Counter Insurgency in the Muslim World
RAND February 11, 2008

"Recognizing that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be the last of their kind, a new RAND Corporation study issued today finds that U.S. capabilities to meet the threat of Islamist insurgencies are seriously deficient and out of balance.

The report finds that large-scale U.S. military intervention and occupation in the Muslim world is at best inadequate, at worst counter-productive, and, on the whole, infeasible. The United States should shift its priorities and funding to improve civil governance, build local security forces, and exploit information — capabilities that have been lacking in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“Violent extremism in the Muslim world is the gravest national security threat the United States faces,” said David C. Gompert, the report's lead author and a senior fellow at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “Because this threat is likely to persist and could grow, it is important to understand the United States is currently not capable of adequately addressing the challenge.”

The findings are from a major review of strategies to combat insurgencies RAND initiated at the request of the Department of Defense.

The study finds that when infected by religious extremism, local insurgencies become more violent, resistant to settlement, difficult to defeat and likely to spread. The jihadist appeal to local insurgents is the message that their faith and homelands are under attack by the West and they should join the larger cause of defending Islam. This makes U.S. military intervention not only costly, but risky.

While the recent military surge has improved security in much of Iraq, “it would be a profound mistake to conclude from it that all the United States needs is more military force to defeat Islamist insurgencies,” Gompert said. “One need only contemplate the precarious condition of Pakistan to realize the limitations of U.S. military power and the peril of relying upon it.”..."

 

Voir :

War by Other Means -- Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency
RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Final Report

 

jeudi 20 décembre 2007

Repères 20/12/07 - al Qaeda fighters

Repères 20/12/07 - al Qaeda fighters

Most al Qaeda fighters in Iraq are from Saudi Arabia and Libya and many are university-aged students, said a study released on Wednesday by researchers at the U.S. Army's West Point military academy.

The researchers at West Point's Combating Terrorism Center found that 41 percent of the fighters were Saudi nationals. Libyan nationals accounted for the second largest group entering Iraq in that time period with about 19 percent of the total, followed by Syrians and Yemenis each at 8 percent, Algerians with 7 percent and Moroccans at 6 percent. On a per capita basis, Libyans accounted for the greatest share of foreign fighters entering Iraq.


Al Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records
Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, West Point's Combating Terrorism Center 2007

 

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