Le Sénateur Joseph R. Biden Jr vient de rendre publique une
étude du Congressional Research Service (CRS) sur les implications, pour les
intérêts économiques et sécuritaires des Etats-Unis, de la croissance de
l'influence globale de la Chine dans le monde. La question posée révèle
l'inquiétude des Etats-Unis face au déclin de sa propre
influence.
The question : How much is China really doing in these regions, and
how much do we knowabout its motivations? What do these widespread PRC
activities mean for the United States and for U.S. global influence: are the
implications necessarily bad and therefore a demonstrable threat to U.S.
interests across the board, or might the implications be benign or in some
instances even positive for U.S. interests? How has this increasing engagement
affected China’s own policies? Finally, what are the economic and political
costs and benefits to China of such international engagement, and are they
likely to be influences for greater pragmatism and nuance in PRC policies or
serve instead to reinforce more hardline and nationalistic sentiments?
CRS Study: China's Foreign Policy and "Soft Power" in South America,
Asia, and Africa, April 2008 (139 pages, PDF). Report Prepared by
the Congressional Research Service at the Request of Senate Foreign Relations
Chairman Joseph Biden
"...As requested, this study focuses on China’s ‘‘soft power’’ projection in
the specified regions. The term ‘‘soft power’’ originally was conceived in 1990
by Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr.. Nye argued that the United States had
reserves of power and influence that were separate from ‘‘hard power,’’ or
military force projection. He expanded greatly on this concept in his book,
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics—partly, he said, from the
frustration of watching ‘‘some policy makers ignore the importance of our soft
power and make us all pay the price by unnecessarily squandering it.’’
According to Nye, soft power is crucially important in today’s world politics
and is significantly more than just the trappings of American culture:
Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others . .
.
[It] is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,
political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the
eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. America has long had a great deal
of soft power . . . .
More broadly speaking, the components of soft power also are defined as
including international trade, overseas investments, development assistance,
diplomatic initiatives, cultural influence, humanitarian aid and disaster
relief, education, and travel and tourism. Although American soft power remains
formidable, by some of these measures it is seen to have declined in the 21
century. In absolute terms, some believe this perceived decline is the result
of the United States’ own policies and actions. One former U.S. Government
official speculates that although America has massive remaining reserves of
soft power, they have become a ‘‘non-renewable resource’’ given current U.S.
policies.6 Others point to multiple global survey results on international
views of the United States, saying ‘‘the downward trend is
unmistakable.’’ As Nye himself puts it:
Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years and the United States’
soft power . . . is in decline as a result . . . . A Eurobarometer poll found
that a majority of Europeans believes that Washington has hindered efforts to
fight global poverty, protect the environment, and maintain peace. Such
attitudes undercut soft power, reducing the ability of the United States to
achieve its goals . . . .
Others have attributed the perceived decline in American soft power as
relative—largely a comparative decline based on the rise of other powers—in
particular the rapid emergence of China as a U.S. ‘‘peer competitor’’ and a
growing source of international influence, investment, and political and
economic power. China is seen to be trying to project soft power by portraying
its own system as an alternative model for economic development, one based on
authoritarian governance and elite rule without the restrictions and demands
that come with political liberalization.
Furthermore, according to this view, ‘‘soft power’’ is ephemeral; the United
States has recovered from loss of prestige and influence before (such as
occurred with the Vietnam War), and it will again. China’s apparent soft power
gains, then, should not be blown out of proportion..."
